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1980] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Proof of delivery and unexplained failure of warehouse to return
stored property upon demand held to establish prima facie case
of conversion
A warehouseman162 who is unable to return bailed property
upon proper demand may be held liable for the value of the prop-
erty on either a negligence63 or a conversion theory.164 Although
142 A warehouseman is "a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire."
N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-102(1)(h) (McKinney 1964). Prior to the passage of the UCC, the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act had defined a warehouseman as "a person lawfully engaged in the
business of storing goods for profit." Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, ch. 732, § 58(1),
[1907] N.Y. Laws 1721 (current version at N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-102(1)(h) (McKinney 1964)). The
dual requirement that a warehouseman be "lawfully engaged" in business "for profit" has
been eliminated under the UCC. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-102, official Comment 2 at 8-9 (McKinney
1964); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 20-2, at 783 (2d ed. 1980).
163 N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(1) (McKinney 1964). While commentators disagree over whether
the bailee was regarded as an insurer at early common law, compare 0. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAW 175 (1923) and F. POLLACK & W. MAITLAND, II THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 191
(2d ed. 1899) with Beale, The Carrier's Liability: Its History, 11 HARv. L. REv. 159 (1897),
it is well settled that the liability of a bailee now is grounded in negligence. Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 346 F. Supp. 892, 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd mem., 472 F.2d
1404 (2d Cir. 1973); Buffalo Grain Co. v. Sowerby, 195 N.Y. 355, 357-58, 88 N.E. 569, 570
(1909); Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N.Y. 260, 264 (1878); Davis v. Lampert Agency, Inc., 30 App.
Div. 2d 299, 300, 299 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (1st Dep't 1968). In the seminal case of Coggs v.
Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703), Chief Justice Holt denoted six types of bailments
from which the modem system of classification has evolved. See id. at 109-13; R. BROWN,
THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERY § 11.1, at 253-55 (3d ed. 1975). The modem system classi-
fies bailments into three types with corresponding degrees of care. W. RICHARDSON, LAW OF
BAIMENTS § 19, at 13 (1930). If a bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailor then the
bailee need only exercise a slight degree of care and will be liable only for gross negligence.
E.g., Jays Creations, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 42 App. Div. 2d 534, 534, 344 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785-86
(1st Dep't 1973); J.W. Mays, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 105, 109-10, 221 N.Y.S.2d
766, 771 (1st Dep't 1961); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. E.H. Trice Motor Co., 203 App.
Div. 218, 220, 196 N.Y.S. 684, 686 (3d Dep't 1922). If, however, a bailment is for the sole
benefit of the bailee then he must exercise great care and will be liable for the slightest
neglect. E.g., Moore v. Westervelt, 27 N.Y. 234, 243 (1863); Pettinelli Motors, Inc. v. Morre-
ale, 39 Misc. 2d 813, 815, 242 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (Oneida County Ct. 1963). Where the bail-
ment is for the mutual benefit of the parties, the bailee must exercise ordinary care and is
answerable only for ordinary negligence. E.g., Aronette Mfg. Co. v. Capital Piece Dye
Works, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 465, 468, 160 N.E.2d 842, 845, 190 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (1959); Jones v.
Morgan, 90 N.Y. 4, 9 (1882); Castner v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 40 App. Div. 2d 1, 3,
337 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (3d Dep't 1972).
I" The contemporary law of conversion originated with Fouldes v. Willoughby, 151
Eng. Rep. 1153 (Exch. of Pleas 1841), wherein Lord Abinger drew the distinction between a
trespassory interference with the possession of a chattel and a conversion which involves the
exercise of dominion and control over the chattel. Id. at 1155-56; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF TORTS § 222A, Comment a, at 432 (1965). While the failure of a bailee to return stored
property upon proper demand is some evidence of conversion, Congregation Anshe Sefard of
Keap St., Inc. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 291 N.Y. 35, 38, 50 N.E.2d 534, 534 (1943), a
demand and refusal to return the property is not a condition precedent to liability. Mullen
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section 7-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) allows a
warehouseman to limit contractually his liability for negligence,"'5
any attempt to limit potential liability for conversion will be
deemed ineffective."' 6 Under either theory of recovery, however,
the bailor bears the ultimate burden of proof.L16 7 While the estab-
v. J.J. Quinlan & Co., 195 N.Y. 109, 115, 87 N.E. 1078, 1080 (1909). A bailee's "overt and
positive act of conversion by an unlawful sale or disposition" vitiates the need for a demand
and refusal. MacDonnell v. Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 193 N.Y. 92, 101, 85
N.E. 801, 803 (1908).
To establish a cause of action in conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate a superior
possessory interest in a chattel and an unlawful exercise of dominion or control over it.
AMF, Inc. v. Algo Distribs., Ltd., 48 App. Div. 2d 352, 356-57, 369 N.Y.S.2d 460, 464 (2d
Dep't 1975); Independence Discount Corp. v. Bressner, 47 App. Div. 2d 756, 757, 365
N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2d Dep't 1975); see RaSTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TowTs § 222A (1965). Gen-
erally, any unauthorized disposition of the bailed property amounts to a conversion. Metro-
politan Vacuum Cleaner Co. v. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp., 208 F. Supp. 195, 198
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp.,
16 N.Y.2d 344, 362, 213 N.E.2d 873, 883, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 799 (1965). For a general discus-
sion of the tort of converson, see Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CoRNuz L.Q. 168
(1957).
... N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(2) (McKinney 1964) provides in pertinent part:
Damages may be limited by a term in the warehouse receipt or storage agree-
ment limiting the amount of liability in case of loss or damage, and setting forth a
specific liability per article or item, or value per unit of weight, beyond which the
warehouseman shall not be liable; provided, however, that such liability may on
written request of the bailor at the time of signing such storage agreement or
within a reasonable time after receipt of the warehouse receipt be increased...
in which event increased rates may be charged based on such increased valuation
.... No such limitation is effective with respect to the warehouseman's liability
for conversion to his own use.
Id. It has been held that section 7-204(2) does not permit a warehouseman to disclaim lia-
bility for his negligence. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Lake Erie Warehouse, 49 App. Div. 2d
492, 494-95, 375 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920-21 (4th Dep't 1975), appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d 888,
352 N.E.2d 580, 386 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976). The UCC provision, to the extent that it autho-
rizes a contractual limitation of liability, represents a codification of the common-law rule.
See Abend v. Haberman, 281 App. Div. 262, 264-65, 119 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (1st Dep't 1953);
Rapp v. Washington StorageWarehouse & Van Co., 75 Misc. 16, 18, 134 N.Y.S. 855, 856-57
(N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1911); cf. Tewes v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 186 N.Y.
151, 156, 78 N.E. 864, 866 (1906) (common carriers may limit liability for negligence
contractually).
I" N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(2) (McKinney 1964); accord, Glinsky v. Dunham & Reid, Inc.,
230 App. Div. 470, 472, 245 N.Y.S. 359, 362 (1st Dep't 1930); Kaplan Prods. & Textiles, Inc.
v. Chelsea Fireproof Storage Warehouse, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 273, 273, 163 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1957) (per curiam).
' The burden of proving negligence or conversion is on the bailor. Claflin v. Meyer, 75
N.Y. 260, 262-64 (1878). Once the bailor has established his prima facie case of negligence
by proving delivery and an unexplained failure to return the subject matter of the bailment,
see note 168 infra, the bailee then bears the burden of furnishing an explanation for the
disappearance of the property. Dalton v. Hamilton Hotel Operating Co., 242 N.Y. 481, 488-
89, 152 N.E. 268, 270 (1926); Weinberg v. D-M Restaurant Corp., 60 App. Div. 2d 550, 550,
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lished rule in New York is that proof of delivery and an unex-
plained failure to return stored property upon proper demand con-
stitutes a prima facie case of negligence,168  the rule regarding
conversion has been less settled. " Recently, in LC.C. Metals, Inc.
v. Municipal Warehouse Co.,170 the Court of Appeals held that
proof of delivery and an unexplained failure to return stored prop-
erty upon demand establishes a prima facie case of conversion.17 1
In LC.C. Metals, the plaintiff, an international metals trader,
delivered a large quantity of an industrial metal to the Municipal
Warehouse Company for storage. 17 12 The warehouse receipts ten-
dered to the plaintiff limited the warehouseman's liability to the
sum of $50 in the event of damage to the bailed property.1 73 The
documents further specified, as required by the UCC, 74 that upon
400 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (lst Dep't 1977). While some courts have erroneously referred to this
as a shift in the burden of proof, e.g., Wintringham v. Hayes, 144 N.Y. 1, 5-6, 38 N.E. 999,
1000 (1894); see Campany v. Brayton, 171 App. Div. 63, 65, 156 N.Y.S. 1010, 1012 (3d Dep't
1916); Golden v. Romer, 20 Hun. 438, 440 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1880), it is now firmly
established that the burden of proof is never shifted from the bailor. Textile Overseas Corp.
v. Riveredge Warehouse Corp., 275 App. Div. 236, 236-37, 88 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (1st Dep't
1949); Koop v. General Am. Transp. Co., 47 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County
1944); W. RICHARDSON, supra note 163, §§ 114-115, at 59-61. One commentator has sug-
gested, however, that bailors frame their cause of action in contract, thereby forcing the
bailee to plead and prove the defense of impossibility and its required elements: objective
impossibility and freedom from fault. Broude, The Emerging Pattern of Field Warehouse
Litigation: Liability for Unexplained Losses and Nonexistent Goods, 47 NEB. L. REv. 3, 19
& n.53 (1968). This, it was argued, would have the effect of shifting the burden of proof
from the bailor to the bailee. Id.
1" See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp.,
16 N.Y.2d 344, 359, 213 N.E.2d 873, 881, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 796 (1965); Stewart v. Stone, 127
N.Y. 500, 506, 28 N.E. 595, 596 (1891); Clafin v. Meyer, 75 N.Y. 260, 262 (1878); Textile
Overseas Corp. v. Riveredge Warehouse Corp., 275 App. Div. 236, 236, 88 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430
(1st Dep't 1949); W. RICHARDSON, EVMENCE § 109, at 88 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
1'4 Compare Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp.,
16 N.Y.2d 344, 350, 213 N.E.2d 873, 875, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 789 (1965) and Bank of Oswego
v. Doyle, 91 N.Y. 32, 41 (1883) and Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N.Y. 260, 263 (1878) (delivery and
unexplained failure to return suffices to establish prima facie case of conversion) with Cen-
tral School Dist. No. 3 v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 43 N.Y.2d 878, 374 N.E.2d 393, 403
N.Y.S.2d 496 (1978) (mem.), aft'g, 55 App. Div. 2d 1021, 1022, 391 N.Y.S.2d 492, 495 (4th
Dep't 1977) and Reichman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 290 N.Y. 344, 352, 49
N.E.2d 474, 477, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 771 (1943) and Wamsley v. Atlas S.S. Co., 168 N.Y.
533, 537-38, 61 N.E. 896, 897-98 (1901) (requires showing of intentional act).
170 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1980), affg, 67 App. Div. 2d 640,
412 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1979) (mem.).
1 50 N.Y.2d at 660, 409 N.E.2d at 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
17 Id. at 661, 409 N.E.2d at 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 374. According to the stipulation of
the parties, the goods were valued at $100,000. Id.
173 Id. at 661, 409 N.E.2d at 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75.
174 See note 196 infra.
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written request of the bailor such liability could be increased up to
the actual value of the goods, provided that a commensurately
higher storage fee was paid.175 Throughout the term of the bail-
ment, the plaintiff did not attempt to increase the limitation of
liability in this manner. When the defendant was inexplicably una-
ble to locate and return the goods upon demand, the plaintiff, ap-
parently seeking to circumvent the contractual liability limitation,
commenced a conversion action for the full value of the stored
property.17 6 Special term granted the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment177 and the Appellate Division, First Department,
unanimously affirmed.178
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of conversion.17 9
Judge Gabrielli, writing for the majority,1 80 initially noted that the
defendant's contention that the goods had been stolen was not
supported by evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact.18
Consequently, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff would clearly
have been entitled to judgment had its action been brought in neg-
ligence. 182 The Court observed that the policy considerations which
mandate that a bailee in a negligence action come forward with
evidence providing an adequate explanation for the failure to re-
turn stored property are equally applicable to conversion ac-
tions.183 Moreover, the majority asserted that it is as reasonable to
'71 50 N.Y.2d at 661, 409 N.E.2d at 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 375. The warehouse receipts
contained limitations of liability which provided in pertinent part:
[T]he total liability of the warehouseman shall not exceed in any event for damage
to any or all the items or articles listed on this warehouse receipt the sum of fifty
($50.00) dollars; provided, however, that such liability may, on written request of
the bailor at the time of signing this . . . receipt or within twenty (20) days after
receipt of this warehouse receipt, be increased. . ., in which event, increased rates
shall be charged based upon such increased valuation ....
Id. at 661, 409 N.E.2d at 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75.
178 Id. at 661, 409 N.E.2d at 852, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
177 Id.
178 67 App. Div. 2d 640, 412 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1979) (mem.), aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 657,
409 N.E.2d 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1980).
50 N.Y.2d at 660, 409 N.E.2d at 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
Judge Gabrielli was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jones, Wachtler,
Fuchsberg, and Meyer. Judge Jasen dissented in a separate opinion.
81 50 N.Y.2d at 664, 409 N.E.2d at 853, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
.82 Id. at 664, 409 N.E.2d at 853, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 376-77.
113 Id. at 667, 409 N.E.2d at 855, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79. The Court explained that the
rule mandating that a warehouseman furnish an explanation for its inability to return
stored goods is grounded in necessity. Id. at 665, 409 N.E.2d at 854, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
Ordinarily, the necessary information will be in the exclusive possession of the warehouse-
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presume that a warehouseman who cannot adequately account for
the loss of stored property has converted the property as it is to
assume that he was negligent with respect thereto.1 A refusal to
recognize such a presumption, according to Judge Gabrielli, would
increase the likelihood of fraud since a warehouseman who con-
verts bailed property could avail himself of a contractual limitation
of liability in a negligence action by claiming ignorance as to the
whereabouts of the goods.18 5 Emphasizing that it was neither insti-
tuting strict liability nor creating a higher standard of care, the
Court concluded that in a converson action, where the bailor had
established the fact of bailment and the refusal to redeliver on de-
mand, the bailee was required to provide an adequate explanation
for its failure to return stored goods in order to raise an issue of
fact and avoid summary judgment."86
Dissenting, Judge Jasen opined that the majority's holding
had eliminated the critical distinction between conversion and neg-
ligence by failing to require an evidentiary showing that the ware-
houseman had intentionally deprived the bailor of his property.1 87
While agreeing that the warehouseman is in a superior position to
explain the loss of stored goods, the dissent nevertheless argued
that reason dictates that the burden of proving conversion, un-
aided by a presumption, remains on the party asserting it. 188 In
cases involving unexplained losses, the dissent suggested that the
majority was imposing "full liability" upon any warehouseman who
was unable to adequately account for the disappearance of the
goods.189 Recognizing that a bailor may increase the level of a
bailee's liability by the payment of a higher storage fee, Judge
man and inaccessible to the bailor. Id. Additionally, placing the burden of providing an
explanation on the bailor would encourage carelessness and dishonesty on the part of the
warehouseman. Id. For these reasons, the Court noted, a warehouseman has not been al-
lowed to avoid liability for its negligence by professing ignorance as to the fate of the stored
property. Id.
1 Id. at 667, 409 N.E.2d at 855, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
Id. at 667, 409 N.E.2d at 855, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
18 Id. at 667-68, 409 N.E.2d at 855, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 379. In limiting its holding to those
instances in which a warehouse can not adequately explain its inability to return stored
property, the LC.C. Metals Court emphasized that it did not mean to suggest that proof of
negligence would support a cause of action in converson. Id. at 665 n.4, 409 N.E.2d at 854
n.4, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 377 n.4. Once a bailee provides a prima facie explanation for its inabil-
ity to deliver, the bailor must then establish the traditional elements of a conversion cause
of action. Id.
Id. at 669, 409 N.E.2d at 856, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 670-71, 409 N.E.2d at 857, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 671, 409 N.E.2d at 858, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
1980]
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Jasen concluded that the courts should not protect sophisticated
businessmen who fail to insulate themselves contractually from po-
tential liability.190
It is submitted that the I.C.C. Metals decision significantly
reduces the potential for abuse inherent in bailment situations. By
holding that uncontroverted proof of delivery coupled with the un-
explained failure to return stored property constitutes a prima fa-
cie case of conversion, the Court, in effect, has eliminated any dis-
tinction between negligence and conversion actions in this
regard.191 Since the possibility now exists that negligent ware-
housemen may be deemed converters,19 2 as a practical matter,
190 Id. at 671-72, 409 N.E.2d at 858, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Jasen, J., dissenting). See
generally note 165 and accompanying text supra. Judge Jasen noted that the bailor is not
required to declare the value of the stored property. Rather, as in I.C.C. Metals, he may
choose not to reveal the value of the goods, thus accepting the contractual limitation on
damages proffered by the bailee, and consequently incur only a "de minimus" bailment fee.
50 N.Y.2d at 671, 409 N.E.2d at 858, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Jasen, J., dissenting). This, the
dissent suggested, results in an inequitable situation when the bailor is subsequently per-
mitted to recover the full value of the lost property notwithstanding that the warehouseman
was never advised of its value. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
191 In Magnin v. Dinsmore, 70 N.Y. 410 (1877), the Court of Appeals suggested that the
net effect of any conceptual overlap between the negligence and conversion causes of action
would be a prohibition against any limitations of liability:
It would be trifling with contracts deliberately made by shippers, and the deci-
sions of our courts, and saying in effect that they could not, by any contract, limit
or restrict their common-law liability to hold that by calling ordinary neglect,
from which loss ensues, a "misfeasance". . . the limitation was nullified, and the
full common-law liability established. The act which will deprive the carrier of the
benefit of a contract for a limited liability ... must be an affirmative act of wrong
doing, not merely ordinary neglect in the course of the bailment.
Id. at 418. Although other authorities are in accord with respect to the necessity of demon-
strating an intentional exercise of dominion and control, see, e.g., W. PRossER, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF TORTs, § 15, at 83 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToiRm § 224,
Comments a & b at 437 (1965), the I.C.C. Metals decision implicitly overrules those Court
of Appeals cases holding that affirmative proof of an intentional act is necessary to establish
a prima facie case of conversion. See Central School Dist. No. 3 v. Insurance Co. of N.
America, 43 N.Y.2d 878, 374 N.E.2d 393, 403 N.Y.2d 496 (1978) (mem.), aft'g, 55 App. Div.
2d 1021, 391 N.Y.S.2d 492 (4th Dep't 1977); Reichman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-
tique, 290 N.Y. 344, 352, 49 N.E.2d 474, 477, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 771 (1943); Wamsley v.
Atlas S.S. Co., 168 N.Y. 533, 537-38, 61 N.E. 896, 897-98 (1901).
192 Professors White and Summers have suggested that the Court of Appeals may have
inadvertently held a warehouseman absolutely liable prior to I.C.C. Metals in Procter &
Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d
873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965). J. WHrrE & R. SUMmERS, supra note 162, § 20-3, at 789. In
Procter & Gamble, the defendant-warehouseman was unable to account for the disappear-
ance of vegetable oil which had been stored in his tanks. 16 N.Y.2d at 350-51, 213 N.E.2d at
875-76, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90. Although there was some dispute over whether the oil was
actually delivered to the defendant, the Court of Appeals held that "in the absence of any
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warehousemen will be compelled to exercise a higher degree of care
to avoid being deprived of a contractual limitation of liability for
negligence. Similarly, by facilitating the establishment of a cause
of action in conversion, the result in LC.C. Metals will deter inten-
tional wrongdoing by unscrupulous bailees who previously could
appropriate goods to their own use while secure in the knowledge
that, at most, they would be subject to an action in negligence
wherein their liability would be limited contractually.
Notwithstanding that the rule of LC.C. Metals will have the
beneficial result of deterring bailee misconduct, it is submitted
that the rationale offered by the Court is of questionable validity.
While the presumption of negligence in bailment situations is logi-
cally grounded both on the probability of misfeasance and the
bailee's superior access to the necessary information,19 s it is doubt-
ful whether common experience or logic would support the major-
ity's conclusion that in the face of the bailee's inexplicable inabil-
ity to redeliver, conversion is as tenable an explanation as is
negligence.1 9 4 Moreover, it is suggested that the public policy con-
cern underlying the majority's decision-that warehousemen would
be able to avoid much of their potential liability 95-has been ade-
explanation of the disappearance" the defendant is liable in conversion. Id. at 350, 213
N.E.2d at 875, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
"9 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343, at 808-09 (2d ed. 1972);
see J. WsrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 162, § 20-3, at 789-91; Broude, supra note 167, at
20. Dean McCormick asserts that probability is the primary consideration in the creation of
a presumption. C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 343, at 807. He suggests that most presumptions
owe their origin to the belief "that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of
fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of fact A until the
adversary disproves it." Id.; accord, Wilkins v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 446
F.2d 480, 484 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972); cf. Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (presumption created by statute in criminal case if there is a "rational
connection between facts proved and the facts presumed").
194 The majority's contention that conversion by the bailee is as probable an occurrence
as negligence on his part fails to differentiate between mathematical possibility and eviden-
tiary probability. It is submitted that in an evidentiary sense, two alternative possibilities
can never be equally probable since evidentiary probability presumes that one alternative is
more probable than not.
M' See 50 N.Y.2d at 667, 409 N.E.2d at 855, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79. New York courts
have traditionally scrutinized clauses purporting to limit liability for negligence. See, e.g.,
Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 297, 177 N.E.2d 925, 926, 220 N.Y.S.2d
962, 964-65 (1961); Boll v. Sharp & Dobne, Inc., 281 App. Div. 568, 570-71, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20,
22-23 (1st Dep't 1953), aff'd mem., 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954); note 165 and ac-
companying text supra. Moreover, in some instances, the legislature has prohibited certain
classes of individuals from disclaiming liability for their negligence. See, e.g., GOL §§ 5-321
(lessors), 5-322 (caterers), 5-323 (building service or maintenance contractors), 5-325 (garage
and parking lot operators), 5-326 (pool, gymnasium or amusement park operators) (McKin-
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quately addressed by section 7-204(2) of the UCC.19e Accordingly,
it would appear inequitable to hold a bailee liable for the entire
value of the stored property especially since he may never have
been aware of the actual value of the goods. It is submitted, there-
fore, that a more evenhanded approach towards remedying poten-
tially fraudulent activity in bailment situations is warranted. One
possible approach would be to limit statutorily the amount of dam-
ages recoverable in either a negligence or conversion action to a
value declared at the commencement of the bailment.
Peter N. Cubita
Warrantless search of arrestee's property inaccessible to him at
time of search not valid as incident to lawful arrest
The fourth amendment to the Constitution protects an indi-
ney 1978). Two Court of Appeals decisions vividly illustrate the judicial hostility toward
attempted limitations of liability. In Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963), the Court addressed the issue of
whether a liability limiting provision accompanying film sold by Eastman Kodak was suffi-
ciently unequivocal to effectively limit the company's liability for negligence. Id. at 302, 189
N.E.2d at 693-94, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The limitation of liability provided:
This film will be replaced if defective in manufacture, labeling, or packaging,
or if damaged or lost by us or any subsidiary company. Except for such replace-
ment, the sale or subsequent handling of this film for any purpose is without war-
ranty or other liability of any kind. Since dyes used with color films, like other
dyes, may, in time, change, this film will not be replaced for, or otherwise war-
ranted against, any change in color.
Id. at 303, 189 N.E.2d at 694, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 339. Although the plaintiff concededly had
notice of the provision, the Willard Van Dyke Court held that the agreement to limit liabil-
ity for negligence was not expressed in sufficiently "clear and unequivocal terms." Id. at 305,
189 N.E.2d at 695, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 340. Alternatively, the Court concluded that the plaintiff
reasonably could have believed that the provision was inapplicable to the processing of the
film because the notice also stated that the cost of processing was not included in the price
of the film. Id. Similarly, in Gross v. Sweet, the Court held that an agreement to "waive any
and all claims" against several defendants did not effectively limit liability for negligence
because the intention of the parties was not expressed in "unmistakable language." 49
N.Y.2d 102, 107-09, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-69; cf. Klar v. H. & M.
Parcel Rooln, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 541, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296
N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947) (bailor must have reasonable notice of and assent to terms
of exculpatory clause).
1 Section 7-204 of the UCC requires that warehousemen who attempt to limit liability
for negligence must, on the written request of the bailor, afford the bailor the opportunity to
increase the level of liability in exchange for the payment of a higher storage fee. N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 7-204(2) (McKinney 1964).
